This paper puts figures to the facts of Eubank (2012), a recently celebrated paper in the Journal of Development Studies. We investigate the underpinning Somaliland-based hypothesis that foreign aid dilutes the positive role of taxation on political governance. The assessment is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. For more policy options, the dataset is disaggregated into fundamental characteristics of African development based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources and landlockeness. While the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in baseline Africa, low-income and English common law countries of the continent, we cannot conclude on its validity for other fundamental characteristics of development. Policy implications, caveats and future directions are discussed. JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55
Introduction
The Eubank (2012) hypothesis has increased the confidence of the Somaliland government and reignited the heated debate on aid and political governance. Recently, Somaliland's minister of energy and minerals (Hussein Abdi Dualeh) openly professed during an African mining conference that Somaliland was better without foreign aid and did not even need it: "That is a blessing in disguise. Aid never developed anything…Aid is not a panacea, we'd rather not have it….How many African countries do you know that developed because of a lot of aid? It's a curse. The ones that get the most aid are the ones with the problems….We've been left to our own devices. We are our own people and our own guys. We pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps. We owe absolutely nothing to anybody. We would not change hands with Greece today. We have zero debt" (Stoddard, 2014) . Before Eubank, the 'Bottom Billion' and 'Dead Aid' by Collier (2007) and Moyo (2009) respectively had also received tremendous feedbacks from policy making and academic circles.
Collier has postulated that because most aid-recipient countries are fragile, weak in governance, inter alia, aid handled through the Official Development Assistance (ODA) program has not had the desired effects. According to this narrative, aid-disbursement mechanisms have not been effective because of four main traps: landlocked with bad neighbors, conflicts, management & dependence on natural resources, and weak governance in small countries. The thesis further sustains that the Bottom billion in poverty are benefiting less on development strategies based on adapting ODAs to a certain benchmark of donor Gross National Income (GNI). The narrative is also broadly in accordance with the position that foreign aid promotes a 'regional public bad' and there appears to be no 'regional public good' effect offsetting the 'public bad' emanating from arms race scenarios in neighboring states (Collier & Hoeffler, 2007 ).
Moyo's 'Dead Aid' is another accomplished literature that has reignited polemics on the appealing effects of development assistance. Her book which emphasizes that aid has augmented dependency, corruption and poverty in Africa has also received many reactions from policy makers and scholars. Whereas, her thesis has been partially supported by a plethora of recent literature using updated data (Banuri, 2013; Marglin, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Asongu, 2012a; Asongu & Jellal, 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Krause, 2013; Asongu, 2014a; Titumir & Kamal, 2013; Monni & Spaventa, 2013) , there is also some moderate consensus on the unsoundness of some of her positions. Accordingly, the classic questions she addresses (for example, the relationship between aid and accountability) and some of her criticisms of the way she uses aid to support her arguments (e.g the rate at which the coincidence between low growth rate and high flows are juxtaposed for evidence that the former is most likely the origin of the latter). These have been used by her opponents and/or defenders of foreign aid. Whereas this narrative does not concern humanitarian and emergency relief assistance, there have been spates of responses among which two merit some emphasis. First, Sachs (2009) has argued that foreign aid is necessary at the tender stage of development and has presented two emotional anti-theses. (1) In his opinion, Moyo does not have the moral values to advocate her position because she was awarded scholarships to study at the top world universities (Oxford and Harvard) and latter in life thinks it is wrong to give a $10 aid to an African child for an anti-malaria bed net. (2) The book substantially fails to consider stark realities of life like, the universal need of help at one point in life, in one way or another. Second, Bill Gate (an American business magnate now philanthropist) has taken the anti-thesis a stride further by qualifying 'Dead Aid' as a 'promotion of evil'. According to him, Moyo's position is morally repugnant to adopt because she appears neither to know what aid is doing nor much about development assistance.
The Eubank (2012) Somaliland-based hypothesis has also been celebrated with the award of the best paper from the Journal of Development Studies in 2013. According to him, the dependence of the state on local tax revenues provides taxpayers with a substantial leverage to demand from government more accountable political institutions and better representation. This thesis has crucial policy relevance in Africa because Somaliland is ineligible for development assistance but has relatively less inter-state conflict and more political accountability. It is interesting to note that the hypothesis is based on literature without any empirical assessment.
Hence, putting some figures to the facts as this paper aims would take the debate to a further height and enhance policy guidance on the validity of the hypothesis in the African continent.
Indeed, the theoretical foundations of the debate are profoundly engrained in the history of economic thought. According to the narrative, the hypothesis originated from negotiations between autocratic governments who were in need of tax revenues (to survive inter-state wars) and citizens who were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater public service delivery and more government accountability (Moore, 2008; Eubank, 2012) .
The principal contribution of this study to the literature is to investigate the Eubank Somaliland-based hypothesis in the context of Africa. In essence, we assess the validity of the postulation that in the absence of foreign aid, there is a more appealing or positive relationship between tax revenues and political governance 2 . The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the nexuses among aid, institutions and development that 2 "For years, studies of state formation in early and medieval Europe have argued that the modern, representative state emerged as the result of negotiations between autocratic governments in need of tax revenues and citizens who were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater government accountability. This article presents evidence that similar dynamics shaped the formation of Somaliland's democratic government. In particular, it shows that government dependency on local tax revenueswhich resulted from its ineligibility for foreign assistanceprovided those outside the government with the leverage needed to force the development of inclusive, representative and accountable political institutions" (Eubank, 2012, p.1). are relevant to the context of the paper. In Section 3, we discuss the data and outline the methodology. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.
Aid, institutions and development
The interesting literature on aid and development in Africa has substantially documented poor quality of institutions to be one of the main causes of poverty. Notably, high corruption, political instability, the absence of property rights, regulatory environments unfriendly to investment, unappealing conditions for contract enforcement, and weak courts (Easterly, 2005) .
According to the narrative, in order for poverty to be mitigated, more advanced countries have to promote credible institutions and political governance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Knack, 2001; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005; Jellal & Bouzahzah, 2012; Asongu, 2012b Asongu, ,2013a Asongu & Jellal, 2013) . The extensive literature on the nexus between aid and institutions has centered around three main themes for over half a century. First, many have assessed the interesting concern of whether more aid is granted to countries with better institutions. Second, the concern of how foreign aid affects the quality of institutions in recipient countries. Third, the challenging preoccupation of how aid can be used as an instrument for the improvement of institutions in recipient countries.
The positioning of the paper on the Eubank hypothesis is consistent with the second strand above. As we have already highlighted, much scholarly attention has been devoted to investigating how aid affects the quality of institutions essentially because government expenditure originating from local taxes is far below foreign aid and the latter: decreases government dependence on local tax revenues and, weakens the quality of institutions (Asongu, 2013a) . The latter effect converges with the Eubank hypothesis on political governance. Whereas there is already a solid consensus on the appealing relationship between tax dependency and political governance (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004) , the incidence of development assistance on the quality of institutions has been subject to intense debate (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Asongu & Jellal, 2013) . Hence, by extending the underlying hypothesis, this paper also complements an extensive literature that has already documented theoretical and empirical foundations of the hypothesis (Morton, 1994; Mahon, 2004; Moore, 2008; Timmons, 2005; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009 ).
In light of the above, whereas the relation between political governance and revenue bargaining has been covered in the literature, to the best of our knowledge the absence of a study that has been dedicated to the whole African continent is a sound justification to examine the Eubank hypothesis. Many of the studies have partially or fully concluded that development assistance should be limited in the continent, so that the Africa should be left to chart its own course of development (Morton, 1994; Collier, 2007; Moyo, 2009 ). The State's dependence on local tax revenues generally leads to better provision of public services and enforcement of property rights (Timmons, 2005) . This hypothesis on the revenue bargaining in political governance has been confirmed in Latin America (Mahon, 2004) and in latter studies on domestic institutions (Mahon, 2005) . A narrative also verified and broadly validated in Ghana (Prichard, 2009 ), China (Bernstein & Lu, 2008) and contemporary developing nations (Moore, 2008) .
The above scope is consistent with a growing strand of the political economy literature suggesting a rethinking of aid-based development models. The Amin (2013) stance on the possibility of neocolonial interest at the center of grand aid is in accordance with the position of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on Africa's entrapment in a web of large scale colonial matrices of power and Kindiki (2011) on the urgent imperative for Africa to strategically overcome its dependence on international wheels of power. According to Amin, development should not the reduced to acceptance or refusal of the Washington consensus or what donors think is good for the African continent. He is joined by Obeng-Odoom (2013) on the position that there is genuine need for a holistic process in which real African needs are clearly articulated.
Before we dive into the empirical analysis, it is worthwhile to devote some space to discussing the highlighted Eubank (2012) hypothesis to elaborate detail. According to the author, the theoretical foundations substantially originate from government's dependence on local tax revenues. Hence, the government is obliged to make political concessions in terms of governance and accountability in exchange for tax income. The adage of 'no taxation without representation' clearly justifies this compromise between taxation and political leadership because it procures the electorate the leverage of asking for greater political representation and voice & accountability.
Since the thesis is more relevant in States that lack natural resources, the study would improve scholarly understanding of how governments can improve the climate of investment by means of credible accountable and representative institutions. The narrative further elucidates that under financial stress, the trade-off between taxation and political concessions is the most optimal means of collecting tax income. Thus, the hypothesis of Somaliland is a new theoretical illustration of the relation between political accountability and tax income in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In summary, verifying the hypothesis improves how much we know already about foreign aid as an instrument that disrupts the solidification of representative institutions due to poor revenue bargaining (or taxation in exchange for improvements in political governance). But, essentially the most appealing justification for investigating the hypothesis is a request for further research by Eubank himself. In essence, he has warned that the findings should not be construed as relevant to Africa unless they are backed by empirical validity.
Data and Methodology

Data
Dependent, independent and control variables
We investigate a panel of 53 African countries with data from Development Indicators of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010. The focus on Africa is to extend the debate on the effect of foreign aid on institutions by Okada & Samreth (2012) , Asongu (2012a Asongu ( , 2013a Criticisms might arise on the source of World Governance Indicators (WGI) because it limits the periodicity from 1996-2010 and consists of data normalized on a yearly basis. Hence, other governance related data from other sources (Polity IV, Freedom House, and ICRG (International Country Risk Guide)) could be presented as an alternative to extend the observation period considerably. We address these concerns on three counts. First, as emphasized above we have used the World Bank measurement of political governance which consists of 'voice & accountability' and 'political stability/no violence'. Second, the constraint of short-time span is consistent with the adopted empirical GMM estimation strategy (where N is large and T is small). Third, to the best of our knowledge, Polity IV and Freedom House indicators are also yearly measurements. Moreover the latter set of indicators relatively displays very low variability. The conception of the former (Polity IV) has varied with time: while it was designed originally as a proxy for the durability of political systems, in later years however, the concept has been broadened in analytical scope to incorporate 'regime type' concerns.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the first main independent variable of interest (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013) . We use three main ODA indicators for robustness purposes, notably: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from Multilateral Donors (MD) and NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. Whereas the first is used in the empirical section, the second and third are employed for robustness checks to assess the consistency of results. It is important to note that the form of aid investigated here is financial development assistance. Accordingly, making this distinction is important for policy orientation (Martinussen, 1997; Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003) . The second main independent variable of interest is the proxy for taxation: Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP (Jellal & Asongu, 2013) .
Consistent with the aid-development literature, we control for press freedom, public investment and inflation. Accordingly, the theoretical and empirical foundations of the investment and fiscal behavior channels have been substantially documented in the aid literature (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Reichel, 1995; Boone, 1996; Gomane et al., 2003; Mosley et al., 2004 ; Larrain & Tavares, 2004; Addison et al., 2005; Easterly, 2005; Bird, 2007; Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008; Morrissey, 2012; Benedek et al., 2012; Jellal & Asongu, 2013) . Accordingly, theoretical underpinnings of foreign aid sustain that it is fundamentally needed to bridge the financial gap (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966) . Foreign aid is necessary to boost public investment (Easterly, 2005) . Asongu & Jellal (2003) have used the fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms to assess the effect of foreign aid on corruption (Asongu & Jellal, 2013) . While we expect press-freedom and public investment to increase political governance, high inflation (especially in consumer prices) should have the opposite effect. The expected signs of the control variables are broadly consistent with the causes of the 2011 Arab Spring (Storck, 2011; Jung, 2011; Thiel, 2012; Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012) .
We also control for the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of time-effects.
Categorization of countries for consistency and robustness checks
In order to improve the subtlety of the analysis, the richness of our dataset allows us to subdivide the panel into various characteristics that are fundamental to foreign aid: incomelevels, legal origins, natural resources and openness to sea. These characteristics have been recently documented as instrumental to foreign aid (Asongu, 2014a) . This categorization is in line with recent African institutional literature (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2014b) .
First, the intuition for legal origins has foundations in the law literature (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999) that has been recently used in the African literature (Asongu, 2014b) . Porta et al. (2008, p. 289) . Second, countries that are not opened to the sea have lower political governance because there is an institutional price of being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007) . Third, there are two justifications for controlling for wealth-effects: (1) it is very likely that economic prosperity has an incidence on political governance, especially when the fruits of the prosperity are not evenly distributed and; (2) income-levels are instrumental in the quality of governance in Africa (Asongu, 2012b) .
Classification of this category is in line with La
Classification of countries in this category is with the help of the Financial Development and
Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank.
Fourth, we use petroleum-exporting countries as the main criterion for the natural resource category. In the classification of this category, several concerns arise. (1) The qualification of countries in this category may be time-dynamic due to: (a) recent discovery of petroleum or; (b) considerable decline in oil exports.
(2) There are some countries with similar macroeconomic characteristics as petroleum-exporting countries (e.g Botswana). To tackle these concerns, we take a minimalistic approach by: (a) including only States for which exports have been petroleum-dominated in the sampled countries for more than a decade and; (b) limiting the resource-category strictly and exclusively to countries that export petroleum.
In the classification of countries above, a country could fall within many categories at the same time because no constraints of categorical priority are imposed. Therefore a country may be in more than one category as long it has the necessary features that are relevant for being identified with the category.
The definition of variables, summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis and categorization of countries are detailed in the appendices: Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively. From the summary statistics, we can infer that plausible estimated relationships could be obtained because of the reasonable degree of variation in the indicators. The correlation analysis has two purposes: mitigate concerns of multicollinearity and overparametization in the same specification and, confirm the degree of substitution between political governance and foreign aid variables. Moreover, the degree of substitution (0.541) between public investment and tax revenue does not pose any substantial issue of multicollinearity
Methodology
Principal component analysis
There could be some redundancy in information because of the high degree of correlation in voice & accountability and political stability constituting political governance. Therefore the study employs Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to mitigate the dimensions of the political governance variables. The PCA has been widely employed to reduce a large set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PCs) that denote a substantial proportion in the variability of the initial dataset. The criterion used to reduce the dimensions of the variables is to retain only PCs with eigenvalues that are greater than one or the mean (Kaiser, 1974; Jolliffe, 2002; Asongu, 2013b) . In this light, the first PC in Table   1 below has an eigenvalue of 1.659 and represents about 82% of information from the constituent indicators. This first PC is the political governance indicator (Polgov). Asongu, 2013b). The main arguments for using dynamic system GMM are that it: (1) mitigates the biases of the difference estimator in small samples; (2) does not eliminate cross-country differences and; (3) controls for endogeneity in all regressors. However, the principal downside of this approach is the employment of data-averages such that estimated coefficients are interpreted as short-run effects and not long-run impacts. Hence, based on this empirical underpinning, the Eubank hypothesis is being investigated in the short-run.
The two equations below in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation procedure.
Where 't' represents the period and 'i' stands for a country. PG is Political governance; The procedure consists of jointly estimating the equations in levels with those in first difference, hence, exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between error term and the lagged endogenous variable. Accordingly, lag levels of the regressors are used as instruments in the difference equation and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the level equation.
We give preference to system GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998 ) as opposed to difference GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991) in accordance recent literature (Bond et al., 2001, pp. 3-4; Asongu, 2013c, p. 49) 5 . In specifying the equations, the two-step procedure is preferred to the one-step because it controls for heteroscedasticity. In order to validate the models; two tests are used as information criteria: the autocorrelation test with a null hypothesis on the absence autocorrelation in the residuals and; the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test with a null hypothesis for the validity of instruments. In a bid to avoid the proliferation of instruments in the Sargan OIR test, we ensure that instruments are less than the number of crosssections in almost all the regressions. We fail to control for time-effects in certain specifications only to void issues of exact multicollinearity and significant autocorrelation tests.
With GMM, one would normally expect a deeper lag structure with more than one lag. In the context of this paper, when the lag structure in the GMM specification is increased, while the results do not change significantly, the AR(2) test as an information criterion becomes 'not applicable'.
Information criteria for validity of underlying hypothesis
Before presenting the results, it is important to discuss the information criteria for the validity of underlying hypothesis. Accordingly, the Eubank hypothesis is valid with a substitution effect, which we discuss in two strands: the mainstream criteria and insights from Brambor et al. (2006) .
First, on the standard criteria, in accordance with Osabuohien & Efobi (2013, p. 299 ), a negative interaction effect implies a substitution impact. On the other hand, a positive interaction effect means that aid and taxation are complementary in improving political governance.
Second, Brambor et al. (2006) has provided guidelines on how to avoid some pitfalls in mainstream interpretation of interaction variables. We are consistent with some of the criteria by incorporating all constitutive variables in some specifications while at the same time controlling for concerns of multicollinearity in other specifications. However, while the joint test (Wald) for the combined significance of constitutive variables has been consistently provided, the interpretation of significance in the marginal effects has not been extended to graphs for the following reason. For the graphs to really make sense economically, we need some range of the modifying variable (see Footnote 14 of Brambor et al., 2006) . While the effective number of presidential candidates used in Brambor et al. (2006) It is also worthwhile to highlight contemporary taxation and aid. The effects of taxation and foreign aid on the dependent variables are not contemporaneous. This is essentially because the specifications consists of regressing the dependent variables in period 't' on independent variables of lagged periods. Accordingly, in the system GMM specification, in order to exploit all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and the error term, lagged levels of the regressors are employed as instruments in the difference equation and lagged differences of the regressors employed as instruments in the level equation. Table 2 below presents baseline regressions. For each governance variables, while the first-two specifications control for multicollinearity, the last specification incorporates the Brambor et al. (2006) caution of including all constitutive terms. Based on the results, the following could be established. First: foreign aid positively impacts political governance; taxation is appealing for political governance; and the interaction between taxation and aid improves political governance. Evidence of a complementary effect or absence of a substitution effect further implies the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in the baseline regressions, contrary to Asongu (2014c) 6 . Second, the models are valid because the null hypotheses of the autocorrelation and Sargan OIR are overwhelmingly rejected. The findings are not biased by issues of instrument proliferation in the overidentifying restrictions because; the number of instruments is substantially lower than the number of cross-sections (countries). Third, the significant control variables have the right signs: inflation increases political governance while press freedom has the opposite effect. When interpreting the signs of the press-freedom estimated coefficients, it is important to note that Freedom House from which the data is sourced reports press freedom values in decreasing magnitude. Hence, countries enjoying the highest levels in press freedom have the lowest reported values (Andrés & Asongu, 2013, p. 674) . A possible reason for inflation increasing political governance is because it is relatively stable across samples. For example, the median inflation rate without Zimbabwe is 5.43%. In Tables 3-4 Instruments  15  15  16  15  15  15  15  15  16  Countries  13  13  10  13  13  10  13  13  10  Observations  48  48  36  48  48  36  48  48 0.007* ---0.015* 0.003 ---0.002 0.008* ---0.026* (0.085) (0.093) (0.339) (0.531) (0.073) (0.055) Tax revenues 0.010** 0.008** 0.017*** 0.0005 -0.001 0.0001 0.005** 0.004 0.022*** (0.015) (0.017) (0.000) (0.773) (0.609) (0.967) (0.033) (0.269) (0.000) Aid* 'Tax revenues' ---0.000 -0.0001 ---0.0001 0.000 ---0.000 -0.0006 (0.734) (0.828) (0.521) (0.740) (0.677) Instruments  12  15  19  15  15  19  15  15  19  Countries  28  28  20  28  28  20  28  28  20  Observations  103  103  64  103  103  64  103  103  64 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics.
Empirical analysis, discussion and policy implications
Presentation of results
2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets. Instruments  15  15  18  12  15  16  15  15  16  Countries  11  11  10  11  11  10  11  11  10  Observations  41  41  35  41  41  35  41  41 Instruments  12  12  19  15  15  19  15  12  19  Countries  30  30  26  30  30  26  30  30  26  Observations  110  110  88  110  110  88  110  110  88 We cannot conclude on the validity of the underlying hypothesis in Tables 5-6 based on the adopted information criteria for a substitution effect. Hence, while the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in Africa, low-income and English common law countries of the continent, we cannot establish its validity for other fundamental characteristics of development.
Further discussion of results, policy implications, caveats and future directions
We have consistently noticed that foreign aid improves political governance. But since the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in some respects, the positive effect of foreign aid on political governance merits some emphasis. Hence, this informs policy that despite the substantially documented issues 7 in donor countries that are currently affecting the flow of aid, its direct effects on political governance is appealing. Given that GMM estimates should be interpreted as short-term effects because we have used non-overlapping intervals to mitigate short-run disturbances that may loom substantially, it is logical to infer that foreign aid improves political governance in the short-term. Two implications are note worthy here. First, because the periodicity of the study covers the post 'Berlin wall' era, it is fairly plausible to find a positive aid-governance nexus. Accordingly, Donor objectives of foreign aid radically changed in the 1990s. In essence, before the fall of the Berlin wall, real politik was the name of the foreign aid game because the prime objective of aid was to deter African nations from allying with the Soviet Union (Gibson et al., 2014) 8 . Second, consistent with Asongu (2013a, p. 14) foreign aid directly improves voice & accountability because it is an essential condition for its disbursement.
Assessing the Eubank hypothesis has improved the scholarly debates on the aidinstitutions nexus at least in a threefold manner. First, by putting an empirical structure to the Eubank literature, we have provided the much needed guidance as to whether the Somalilandbased findings are relevant across Africa. This is in direct response to a request for further research by Eubank who has clearly warned that his findings should not be construed as reflecting the overall African context unless they are backed by some empirical evidence.
Second, we have taken the extant of knowledge on the drivers of accountable and representative governments to another platform. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the dependence on tax revenues by government as an income channels to political accountability has been scarcely covered in the literature (Mahon, 2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Moore, 2008; Prichard, 2009 Hence, a long-term assessment is an interesting future research direction. Moreover, in the appreciation of development assistance, the analysis has failed to distinguish between grants and concessional loans. Therefore, it is also worthwhile to assess the dynamics of foreign aid that positively interact with tax effort to improve political governance. In addition, we concur with one of the referees on the position that, since of most of the data is sourced from the World 
Conclusion
This paper has put figures to the facts of Eubank (2012) This conclusion should not be assumed as an extension of the heated debate on the recognition of Somaliland by the international community. Accordingly, the objective of the paper has simply been to assess the empirical validity of a celebrated literature. 
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